Why Pay Taxes When No One Else Does? by Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N.
IZA DP No. 4153



























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
April 2009 




Gil S. Epstein 
Bar Ilan University, 
CReAM and IZA  
 
Ira N. Gang 
Rutgers University, 












P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 













Why Pay Taxes When No One Else Does?
*
 
In this paper we try to understand the phenomena whereby a large proportion of the 
population evades tax payments. We present a model which incorporates elements from the 
theory of information cascades with the standard model of tax evasion and analyze the 
connection between the decision of a potential tax evader, the number of tax evaders and the 
number caught in previous periods. General conditions exist under which any expected utility 
maximizing tax evaders will decide to emulate other tax evaders. 
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1.  Introduction 
Taxes are inevitable in life, though many people prefer not paying them.  People weigh 
the costs against the benefits when determining whether, and how much, to tax evade. 
Since the early work by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) a substantial literature has 
developed on the economics of tax evasion (Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998; 
Goswami, Sanyal, and Gang, 1991; Sanyal, Gang, and Goswami 2000; Das-Gupta and 
Gang, 2000).  The evasion decision in the standard model is captured in a simple 
expected utility maximizing problem.  Based on the probability of detection by the 
authorities, individuals decide whether to evade and, if they evade, the optimal level of 
evasion.  Empirical evidence reveals inter-dependency among taxpayers, as reflected in 
the increased likelihood of evasion when others are believed to be evading (Geeroms and 
Wilmots, 1985). Dunn (1992) has pointed out that strong empirical evidence reveals, 
contrary to standard tax evasion theory, that deterrence does not increase tax compliance. 
    Our model looks at the connection between the decision an individual makes regarding 
tax evasion and the number of other individuals already evading.  Awareness is restricted 
to a single tax:  an income tax levied on individuals (households or firm). Awareness of 
other individuals has begun to be incorporated into evasion models. Gang and Das-Gupta 
(2003) examine transactions matching, an enforcement activity which systematically 
throw up information of use in examining other taxpayers. Bose and Gangopadhyay 
(forthcoming) introduce a role for intermediaries; Hunt (2004) examines the implications 
of trust and personal relations.  Our theoretical framework uses information cascades 
(herd effects) to explain tax evasion.  Information cascades were used by Scharfstein and 
Stein (1990), Banerjee (1992), Gul and Russell (1995) in investment applications, and by 
Epstein (2002) to migration.  The theory also offers interesting insights in explaining tax 
evasion. 
    Potential tax evaders do not have perfect information regarding the best choices or the 
probability of being caught.  Evasion decisions are sequential; each person looks at the 
decisions made by previous individuals over time, before making his/her decision.  This 
is rational behavior on the supposition that previous individuals had information the 
potential evaders do not.  The outcome is a private decision rule, which may give rise to 
herd behavior.  Individuals discount private information and decide to tax evade,   
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emulating other individuals' actions.    
    Approximately one-third of U.S. households underpaid their 1998 taxes (Andreoni, 
Erard and Feinstein (1998) citing the 1988 taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program). 
Compliance and enforcement data are difficult to obtain.  Studies in Spain (de Juan, 
Lasheras and Mayo, 1994), Switzerland (Pommerehne, Hart and Frey, 1994) and Jamaica 
(Alm, 1991), indicate that the effects of income, tax rates, and enforcement on 
compliance vary.  Swiss evasion is estimated to be about 17.5% of income while in 
Jamaica the estimate is 3%. In Jamaica 66% of taxpayers were found to have underpaid 
their taxes.  Ineffective tax administration is a chronic problem in many developing 
countries and has a direct effect on tax evasion (Stella, 1993).
1 Krugman, Alm, Collins 
and Remolina (1992) cite a study on the Philippines, which suggests that as little as 50% 
of income in 1985 was actually reported and only 27% of those with taxable incomes 
filed. Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2002) show that income inequality raises crime 
rates against both individuals and the government. Flatters and MacLeod (1995) show 
that administrative corruption, whereby taxpayers and collectors collude to reduce 
remissions, is central to tax evasion in developing countries. For Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile, Fishlow and Friedman (1994) show tax compliance declines when current incomes 
decline. Therefore, the struggle to evade taxes is a struggle against government, an 
institution which is prone to greater weakness in poorer developing countries.  These 
issues gain importance as large-scale tax evasions impede the ability of such countries to 
catch up with more developed countries. State authority is weakened, limiting its 
capability to play a positive role in development.   
    We try to understand the phenomena in which a large proportion of the population 
evades taxes.
2 We assume individuals do not know the real value of the detection 
probability.  Decisions are made sequentially. Each individual has private information.  
However, over time, individuals learn by looking at a specific sample of people, some of 
whom evade taxes and some who don’t, some who are caught and fined and some who 
are not.  Of course, this may not be a random or a representative sample.  Moreover, 
private information is only in the possession of individuals; the government does not 
have this information and the information each person receives may overlap with the 
information others receive.
3 Some see the same individuals and some see others.   Given   
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this information, individuals update their expectations regarding the true value of the 
probability of detection and decide whether to evade tax obligations or fully comply. 
 
2. The Model 
2.1 The basic model  
Consider a country with a large population. The population is heterogeneous with respect 
to the utility extracted at a given level of income.
4 Denote by Ui(w) the utility level of 
individual i with a net income level of w. Each individual has to determine whether to 
evade paying taxes.  We employ the standard Yitzhaki (1974) analysis of the extent of 
evasion.  The utility of individual i, with gross income y, a tax rate of t, and who chooses 
not to evade paying taxes, is given by 
  ( ) ( )) 1 ( t y U w U i i − = .    (1) 
The expected utility of an individual who decides to evade paying taxes is given by
5 
  () () ( ) ( ) ( ) Ft y U p y U p w U E i i i − + − = 1 ) ( 1,  ( 2 )  
where p is the probability of detection, i.e., tax evaders are not left alone, but there is less 
than 100% auditing. If the individual is caught he will pay a fine of F for each dollar of 
taxes that he did not pay.   Thus the fine equals  t F y .     
    Each individual has to decide whether to evade or not.   An individual will tax evade if 
() () ( ) () w U w U E i i > . From (1) and (2) we obtain that an individual will tax evade if 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
() ( ) () Ft y U y U










From standard results on risk evasion, and, as can be shown in the above equation, as the 
level of risk evasion increases the critical probability of detection decrease.  Consider a 
simple example where an individual's utility is a linear function of his income: 
() w w Ui = .  Comparing (1) and (2) we see that for an individual to tax evade it must 
hold that () ( ) ( ) t y y Ft p y p − > − + − 1 1 1 .  Therefore, the individual evades taxes if and 
only if  p < 1/F.  
    In this section our analysis described the behavior of the individuals in the economy.  
The probability of detection is a given and is constant over time.  Next we discuss a 
simple dynamic sequential model in which the detection probability is unknown.  All   
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individuals evaluate this probability, given the different information they may have at the 
time they make their decisions. 
  
2.2 A signaling model with homogeneous agents 
Consider the case of preferences are homogeneous, i.e.  ( )( ) i w U w Ui ∀ = , and the 
probability of detection is unknown.  If an individual does not receive any information, 
his/her prior estimate regarding the probability of detection is given by φ . With complete 
uncertainty – where the individual has no knowledge at all regarding the detection 
probability – φ   is one-half.  However, even though there is some evidence that 
individuals do overestimate the probability of detection, such a high estimate for a 
taxpayer, whose evasion has not been previously detected, is unrealistic.
6 Without other 
information, an individual should not evade taxes.  Therefore, φ < 0.5.  
    Each individual calculates the critical probability p
*
  under which he will not evade 
paying taxes – the probability under which condition (3) does not hold.  From the flow of 
imperfect information, a person receives a signal suggesting whether he/she should tax 
evade or not.
7 With probability q the signal providing this information is true. If false, it 
does not provide information regarding the true signal.   To simplify we assume q > 0.5.
8 
Moreover, we assume that 1-p
* < q and similarly 1-φ < q .
9           
    Individuals make sequential evading decisions. Information is periodically revalued 
and replenished, and may, for example, be derived from years of observing others 
(friends, relatives, etc.). Information is private, as the individual observes a sample of 
people and not the whole population.  Each individual believes that his sample is 
representative and acts accordingly.  Let us describe it in the following way: at a given 
age, people contemplate the possibility of evading tax payments.  In the sequential 
decision process, people of different ages make decisions at different times.  Each person 
has private information when making his or her decision.  He or she may have received a 
signal, and can also observe the behavior of those preceding them.  Potential tax evaders 
cannot, however, observe the information revealed by the signal, which was the basis for 
previous individuals’ decisions.  Given the information available, each person chooses 
whether to evade paying taxes or not.     
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    To simplify our analysis, we assume that a potential tax evader will decide to tax evade 
if the probability of detection is lower than the probability of not been detected, namely 
lower than a half.  This could be generalized taking into account type I and II errors 
(evading when you shouldn’t and not evading when you should). Here we simplify 
describe the mechanism where many people evade. In the appendix we describe the more 
generalized decision-making taking into account these two types of errors.   
    Assumptions governing individuals’ actions. The structure of the game and Bayesian 
rationality are common knowledge.  Moreover, we assume a person who is indifferent 
about following his or her own signal and emulating someone else’s choice will follow 
his or her own signal (assumption a).   We now consider the different possibilities facing 
the individual in the sequential decision process. 
    First person making a decision. This person will follow his or her signal.  The 
probability that this action is maximizing the individual’s utility is q>0.5. 
    Second person.  If this person has received a signal not to evade and the previous 
person has decided not to evade taxes then he or she follows the first person.  If the two 
persons have different signals, the second person is indifferent about following his or her 
own signal or emulating the other person.  This is true as both persons have the same 
probability of their signal being true (q).   Using assumption a, the second person will 
thus follow his or her own signal. 
    Third person. Denote the action of evading by “a” and the decision not to evade by 
“n”. If the first two persons have chosen to evade, and person number three has a signal 
not to evade, then the probability that the third person should evade is given by 
) , , Pr( n a a a (the sequence “a,a,n” states the first person evaded, the second person evaded 
and the their person received a signal not to evade). In this case the third person will 
decide to evade.
10 Formally, using the Bayesian rule: 
   ( )
()
( )( )
()() () φ φ
φ






) Pr( , , Pr
) , , Pr( 2 2
2
q q q q
q q
a n n
a a n a a
n a a a . (4)   
    For example, if q=0.55 and  48 . 0 = φ  then we obtain 6735 . 0 ) , , Pr( = n a a a .  An individual 
will evade if, and only if, the probability to evade is greater than a half.  In other words, 
the probability of not being caught,  ) , , Pr( n a a a , is greater than the probability of being   
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For q=0.55 and  48 . 0 = φ ,  3265 . 0 ) , , Pr( = n a a n . 
    Since  5 . 0 < φ  and q > 0.5 the ratio of both probabilities is given by: 





) , , Pr(









n a a n
n a a a
. (6) 
According to our example,  324 . 1
) , , Pr(
) , , Pr(
=
n a a n




Proposition 1:  Given the above assumptions, in a population consisting of k tax evading 
individuals and d individuals who received signals not to evade, all new individual 
deciding whether to evade or not, will choose, regardless of their signal, to  evade taxes 
if k-d ≥ 2. 
 
Proof:  Given a population consisting of k tax evading individuals and d individuals who 
received signals not to evade and do not evade, a new individual, who receives a signal 
not to evade, will calculate the probability of not being caught:  
  ( ) ( )
) , ... , ... Pr(
1 1
) , ... , ... Pr(
1
n n n a a
q q








    In  this  case,  with  probability




d q ,  d individuals receive the wrong signal.  In the same way the 
individual may calculate the probability of being caught: 
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) , ... , ... Pr(
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) , ... , ... Pr(
1
n n n a a
q q
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n n n a a n
n n n a a a
. (9)   
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Thus for equations (4), (5) and (6), ratio (9) is greater than one if  k-d-1≥1 ,  i.e.,   k-d ≥ 2.  
￿ 
 
    The proposition states that if the number of tax evaders is greater than the number of 
individuals who do not evade taxes by at least two, then each new individual, who has to 
decide whether to evade or not, will always decide to evade regardless of what type of 
signal he or she receives.  Individuals hear about those in their sample who evaded.  
Moreover, even though there may be overlapping among the samples, each individual has 
his own reference group – the large group of people with whom an individual interacts – 
and his information is private. One could think that the reference group facing each 
individual is from a specific profession.  We may see all doctors evading while lawyers 
do not.  Or we may witness the doctor visiting his lawyer friend while the plumber is 
working in the house; the doctor obtains information about the actions of the lawyer and 
the plumber.  Here there is overlapping between different reference groups and thus the 
evasion decision is interdependent among groups.
12 
 
2.3 A signaling model with apprehension  
We now consider the case in which individuals not only observe the actions of others but 
also observe if any of the tax evaders were detected by the authorities.  Case-Based 
Decision Theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1995) states that if an individual sees that 
someone has been apprehended it may have a stronger impact on the individual's 
perception.   
    Let us look at the case in which an individual makes a decision on whether to evade 
taxes.  The information he/she is faced with at the time of the decision is: 1) there are d 
non-tax evaders; 2) k tax evaders and 3) from the k evaders c have been caught.  All this 
information helps the individual calculate the probability, p, of being caught if evading. 
    When an individual sees someone being apprehended for evasion, this is interpreted by 
him/her as a probability of g that he (the individual who is currently making the decision) 
should evade.  It is not clear whether g is greater or smaller than q (the probability that 
the general signal the individual receives is true). Case based theory suggests that g>q, 
however this may not be the case.  Since actually seeing someone being apprehended   
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may have a stronger effect on the decision making of the individual, we distinguish 
between the general signals the individual receives and the number he has personally 
witnessed being caught evading.   
    If this individual receives a signal not to evade, then the probability of being caught 
equals: 
  ( ) ( )
) , ,... , ... , ... Pr(
1 1
) , ,..., , .,.., , , .,.. Pr(
1
n b b n n a a
g q q
n b b n n a a a
c d k






The numerator represents the case where with probability
c k q




d q , d+1 individuals obtained incorrect signals and with 
probability ()
c g − 1,   c were apprehended. Similarly,  ) , ,..., , .,.., , , .,.. Pr( 1 n b b n n a a a c d k −  
equals  
  ( ) ( )
) , ,... , ... , ... Pr(
1 1
) , ,..., , .,.., , , .,.. Pr(
1
n b b n n a a
g q q
n b b n n a a n
c d k






We may calculate the ratio between the two probabilities: 
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n b b n n a a n
n b b n n a a a
. (12) 

































. (13)   
If q = g it is as if the number of individuals that have decided not to evade taxes has 
increased by c, while the number of tax evaders has decreased by c. This shows that 
seeing someone being apprehended does not have a special effect on the individual 
deciding to evade or not.  Otherwise, if q< g, then the difference between the number of 
tax evaders and non-evaders, which causes an individual to go against his/her signal, will 
increase.      Let us illustrate this result using the numerical example presented above:   
q=0.55, g=0.7, d=5 and c=2; in order for an individual to go against the signal he 
received and decide to evade, the number of tax evaders must be at least k = 17 and k - c   
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= 15.  For g= 0.8, k - c = 20.   On the other hand, if g= 0.6 then k - c = 12. We may thus 
conclude that: 
 
Proposition 2:  If individuals observe others caught evading taxes and g>q, in order for 
individuals to go against their own signal and evade: (a) The difference, between the 
number of individuals who evade taxes and those who  do not evade, will be larger than 
in the case where detection is not observed; (b) Increasing the probability that the signal, 
generated by observing detection is true, will require an increase in the difference 
between the numbers of individuals who evade and those who do not tax evade. 
 
2.4  A signaling model with heterogeneous agents 
We return to the basic description of the model in which the individuals are 
heterogeneous with respect to the levels of utility generated from a given income; this can 
be thought of as different levels of risk aversion.  Let Ui(w) denote the utility level of 
individual i with income level of w.   
    Individuals now differ with respect to their risk aversion and, as we have a continuum 
of individuals distributed by level of utility for a given detection probability, there will be 
a proportion of the population that will evade.  This can be seen from equation (3): 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t y U Ft y U p y U p i i i − > − + − 1 1 ) ( 1 . (3’) 
    For  a  given  gross  income  level  of  y,  each individual will have a different critical 
probability, which will determine if he or she will decide to evade, pi
*.  It is important to 
note that all individuals are different in their degree of risk aversion and thus have a 
different critical probability for evasion.  Individuals may know the distribution of risk 
aversion in the population; however, they do not know the actual risk aversion level of 
each individual.  Therefore, the value of qi, the probability that the signal is true, depends 
on the risk aversion of the individual who is receiving the signal.  The same would be 
true for the value of gi.  An individual receiving a signal does not have knowledge of the 
level of risk aversion for each person in the population, therefore he calculates the 
weighted level of qi and gi for all those that received a signal or have been apprehended 
given the distribution of risk aversion in the population. In other words, if the distribution 
of risk aversion in the population of the reference group of an individual is given by f(.)   
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(level of risk aversion is given by λ ), then the individual, who has to decide to tax evade 
or not, will take into account all the information available and calculate a probability q 
and g :  () ( ) . , f q q θ =  and  () ( ) . , f g g ω =  where  g and q  are information vectors and () . θ  
and  () . ω = g are functions that transfer the information into a one dimension variable. For 
example the functions can be the means of the distribution: 
∫ ∫ = = λ λ λ λ λ λ d f g g and d f q q ) ( ) ( .  With q and g, each individual calculates the 
detection probability. 
    First period. Assume that in the model’s first period all individuals receive signals.  
All individuals for whom the probability of detection is lower than the probability that the 
signal is true, q, decide to evade. Others join those who did not receive a signal and do 
not evade. 
    Second  period.  In the second period, all individuals who did not evade receive 
signals.
13 They either receive a signal to evade or a signal not to evade.  As in the first 
period, the probability that the signal is true is q.  Moreover, individuals receiving signals 
in the second period observe the actions of the individuals from the first period.  They 
can see how many individuals decided in the previous period to evade and how many of 
them were detected by the authorities.   
    Using a variation in the notation presented above: at time t each individual knows that 
during the previous period, t-1, there were dt-1, non-tax evaders, kt-1 tax evaders and from 
the kt-1 evaders ct-1 have been caught.  Thus an individual who received a signal not to 
evade may calculate the ratio between the probability of evading and not evading in a 
similar way to (7): 


























1 ) , ,..., , .,.., , , .,.. Pr(
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n b b n n a a n
n b b n n a a a
. (14) 










.  In the previous section, the criterion for tax 
evasion was that this ratio is greater than one.  In the current story, the higher the value of 
this ratio, the larger is the number of individuals who evade taxes. It is clear that if the 
total number of evaders who are not caught increases over time against a given amount of   
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evaders who have been caught, the ratio increases and the number of evaders increases 
from period to period.  Moreover, in each period, the increase in tax evaders increases the 
ratio for those considering tax evasion in the next period.  In the case where the number 
of tax evaders who have been caught increases, whether or not an individual will evade is 
not clear.  Note this individual receives a signal not to evade therefore evasion is going 
against the signal he obtained.  This will happen only if the increase in tax evaders is 
relatively greater than the number of evaders who have been detected.  
    Assume that equation (13) is true at time t-1.  At time t the question is: what happens at 
the boundary (right hand side of equation (13))?  This, of course, depends on the increase 
in the total number of evaders, non-evaders and number of individuals who have been 
caught over time.  Denote the total number of evaders, tax payers and the total of those 






t t c c and d d k k
00 0 . ,  The values of q and g 








    We consider how an increase in the number of individuals, who have been caught, 
affects the boundary determining the number of individuals evading tax payments, Q.   
Of course, when we move from one period to another, the number of individuals, who are 
caught may increase but, at the same time, the total number of individuals deciding to 
evade paying taxes and the number of individuals paying taxes who received signals, may 
increase.  The change in Q, as a result of an increase in the number of individuals caught, 
















Q d k ε ε − + + −
=


























= ε ε . 
    From (16) we can see the conditions under which an increase in the total number of all 
three components increases this boundary.  A sufficient condition for the boundary to 
increase is that the proportion of individuals being caught is less than the proportion of   
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increase in the number of individuals deciding to evade tax payments and is greater than 
the increase in those who decide not to evade.   Summarizing,  
  
Proposition 3: Given an increase in the number of evaders, non-evaders and individuals 
caught evading, there exist conditions under which new individuals will decide to tax 
evade, regardless of the signal:  ( ) ( ) kd kd εε −+ − > − 1 1 1,  i.e., the increase in the 
number of individuals caught is relatively smaller than the increase in the other 
components. 
 
3. Concluding remarks 
We try to understand the phenomena in which a large proportion of the population evades 
taxes.  The struggle to evade taxes is a struggle against government, a man-made 
institution, which is prone to greater weakness in poorer developing countries.  These 
issues gain importance as large-scale tax evasion increasingly impedes the ability of such 
countries to catch up with more developed countries.  Moreover, the authority of the state 
is weakened, limiting its capability to play a positive role in development.  The theory of 
information cascades has been usefully applied to explaining behavior in a number of 
different contexts where individuals appear to discount their private information and to 
copy the decisions of others.  Such duplication, based on what others are doing, 
reinforces the tendency for further duplication. 
        Weak states are a characteristic of poor developing economies.  While corruption 
exists in rich and poor countries, in rich countries the average person can go through their 
daily activities without directly confronting corruption while in poor countries corruption 
is more direct, more in your face and more widespread.  Some interpret the widespread 
corruption in developing countries as part of their moral (or amoral) fabric.  We like to 
think this is not so, that there is generally not a cultural acceptance of corruption; what 
we witness is people behaving under severe information constraints.  We presented a 
model that uses different elements from the theory of information cascades and show 
conditions under which individuals decide to emulate other individuals and evade.   The 
probability of detection is unknown. Individuals considering the option of evading taxes 
seek as much information as possible before making a decision.  This can bring about a   
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situation in which any potential tax evader will, in the end, evade as he sees others doing, 
so believing they have information which he does not have.
  In the long run, the tax 
evasion may include the entire population.    
- 14 - 
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Endnotes 
1. Weak tax administration plagues countries such as India, Mexico and different 
CIAT countries (Dunn, 1992; Das-Gupta, Lahiri and Mookherjee, 1995; Das-Gupta and 
Mookherjee, 1998).  Das-Gupta and Mookherjee, 1998, consider policies governments 
undertake to enhance their capability of enforcing essential taxes, focusing on the level of 
tax evasion. 
2. Alternatively, one could consider where a large proportion of the population does 
not evade. 
3. David Cay Johnston (New York Times, 16 February 2001) presented data on the 
percentage of individuals audited in 1999, 2000 and a forecast for 2001. The article also 
contains information on the correlation between being audited and income level.  The 
Economic Times (www.economictimes.com) has published many articles on tax evasion 
in India and other developing countries: December 13, 2004, the Income Tax department 
demanded Rs 820 crore (one crore = 10 million) from Slocum Investment; an October 28 
editorial states "a large part of tax evasion and cheating of investors by managements can 
also be traced back to the absence of a transparent system of political funding."   
4. People may have different social customs and conformity costs for evading taxes 
(Myles and Naylor, 1996, Akerlof, 1980).  
5. In Yitzhaki (1974) the question addressed is to what extent to evade taxes.  
6. Audit rates and detection probabilities typically differ among taxpayers even in 
explicitly specified groups.  Only 4.1% of all U.S. taxpayers whose federal returns were 
reassessed following an audit received any penalty for fraud, negligence, false 
withholding, failure to report tips, or other infractions (Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 
1998). 
7. A different way of looking at this is that an individual receives information which 
tells him whether the real probability is less or greater than p
*. This can be generalized to 
the individual receiving a signal with probability 0 < l < 1.  The main results still hold.  
This is saying the signal received is whether the detection actual probability is greater or 
less than the critical one.  
8. If the probability of q is not certain, the individual chooses to evade taxes using 
mixed strategies.  As more information arrives having positive signals with regard to tax 
evasion, even though the individual acts according to mixed strategies, the probability of 
tax evasion increases. 
9. This simplifies matters.  An equivalent assumption is 1-p-s<q for s> 0 and 
similarly forφ .  
10. Of course, this is true when the first two individuals choose not to evade paying 
taxes and the third receives a signal to evade. The last will emulate the previous 
individual's actions.   
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11. If one of the previous persons chooses not to evade and the other person chooses 
to evade, then the third person will follow his signal, 
  ( )
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. It 
is clear that if  5 . 0 = φ  (if an individual does not receive any information then his/her prior 
estimate regarding the probability of detection is one half), the third individual follows 
his signal and not evade.   Given our assumption that 1-φ < q, it is clear the ratio in (7) is 
greater than one and thus the individual will follow his signal and not evade. 
12. Herd behavior may also cause a large decrease in the proportion of evaders.  
Each knows with probability p that people receive signals; if he feels he knows a 
sufficiently large proportion do not evade (a proportion greater than p), it would be clear 
to him that some received signals not to evade. He can use this information to decide 
whether to evade. If the proportion not evading is sufficiently large, then, even if he 
receives information to evade, he will not. 
13. This can be generalized to the case where all individuals receive signals, i.e., not 
only the individuals who did not evade taxes.  This does not change the results.   
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Appendix – type one and typo two errors 
When deciding whether to evade, each individual examines two types of errors:  I. Evade 
when he/she shouldn't; II. Not evade when he/she should. Define: (i) U as individual's 
utility from not evading, (ii) E(z) as expected utility from evading given the value of the 
detection probability, p, equals z and (iii)  ( ) 0 p V  as expected gain if choosing evasion 
optimally for p = p0 when actually  λ = p . The expected gain from ignoring the signal 
compared to following it for  λ < <
*
0 p p  is  () ( ) ( ) [ ] () [] 0 0 1 . p V U q U p E q G − − − − = . The 
value of  () λ , , 0 q p G may be positive or negative depending on the precise values of  , , 0 q p  
the distribution of λ  and the degree of risk aversion of the individuals.  Consider how 
() λ , , 0 q p G  is calculated.  The first part is straight-forward.  The second part,  ( ) 0 p V , 
needs more  explanation.  Given the signal and the information an individual has, he 
recalculates the probability of detection p. He then comes up with updated probability, 
the value of p0.  However, this may not be the correct value and the probability of 
detection may be higher.  Thus real expected utility may be lower than the individual 
believes.  Expected utility depends on the normalized distribution of alternative 
probabilities given the individual’s information, f ( λ ). Using (2), 
() ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) λ λ λ λ λ λ
λ λ






− + − =
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1 1 0 . Every time the individual 
updates the probability of detection and it decreases, the distribution f(λ ) puts a higher 
density on the lower levels λ  and a lower density of the higher levels of λ .   The rule the 
















, , 0 λ .  Notice that in calculating 
G(.) the individual calculates the updated probability of detection p0 given all the 
information he has at the time.  The individual can calculate the critical probability under 
which he will decide whether to evade or not.  The critical probability will be a function 
of the individual's utility function, the probability that the signal is true, q, the distribution 
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.  If the probability of not been detected 1-p  is greater than     
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() λ , 1 q g −  then the individual will tax evade. Therefore, there is no closed-form solution.  
To obtain a closed-form analysis, and since we are talking about two types of 
decisions, we assume if the first individual obtains a signal, the critical probability of not 
been detected,   () λ , 1 q g −   equals a half.  If more information is obtained in favor of 
evasion, this critical probability will decrease.  Therefore, a sufficient condition to evade 
will be higher than half with the probability of not being caught, given all the information 
available. This is identical to an individual, who calculates the probability that the correct 
action is tax evasion, and, if this is greater than the probability of not evading, he will 
decide to tax evade (similar to the herd behavior literature; Banerjee, 1992, Scharfstein 
and Stein, 1990).  